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SPECIESISM AND SEXISM
Emma Munro

On a global scale the most exploited humans are women and in factory
farming the most exploited animals are female. Women are severely
exploited through the non-recognition of unpaid subsistence activities
and home-maker services as ‘real work’. By ‘real work’ I mean a fiscally
responsive operation, within current Western economic systems.
Consequently, as Marilyn Waring argues, this 'hidden economy' means
that women are under-counted in the labour forces and their
contributions are not recognised in national accounts.1
Similarly, female animals are over-exploited on the basis of their sex.2
According to Gruen, the egg industry is indicative of abusively
exploitative farming practices. Egg factory farming generates
approximately 4.2 billion, that is 95% of all eggs in the United States
every year. De-beaked hens are confined for 12 to 18 months in wire
mesh cages, without room to move around, stretch their wings, or build
nests.2 In the United States, more than 100 million cows, sows, sheep and
5 billion chickens, (mostly hens and chicks) are raised and slaughtered
for food production each year.3 Mechanistic, assembly-line processes,
designed for efficient, economical and ever increasing production
dominate the husbandry of these animals.4 The infliction of pain and
slaughter in the pursuit of profit and technological advancements is
justified through constructing the experimental subject or farm animal as
other. Being other means that animals are constructed and interpreted as
being without desires, interests or feelings. On what basis are they
judged as without these qualities? Gruen argues that the symbolic
operation of the categories woman and animal satisfy equivalent
predominantly utilitarian functions in Western patriarchal societies.
Their similarities are presumed to be natural, which disguises both
motive and investment of speakers and discourses that construct/ed the
natural connection. Theoretical and practical correlations between
woman and animal are manifest in everyday life and in the ideology
that justifies and preserves their submission to masculine authority.5
For instance, scientific experimentation regarding reproduction has been
justified on the basis that potential benefits outweigh emotional and
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physical suffering. The human contraceptive pill can increase the risk of
blood clots and heart attack. IUDs can induce haemorrhages and bring
about infertility. Hormonal treatment has uncalculated short and long
term effects. Surgical intervention and manipulation with the risks of
anaesthetisation and infection are all ‘justifiable risks’. How is it that the
failure rate of contraceptive technologies has contributed to the infertility
that reproductive technologies are designed to address? The basis for
justifying these technologies provides the answer.
A fundamental basis that justifies this way of thinking is derived from
traditional Western philosophy. The systematic connections inherent in
the dichotomisation of subject/other, polarises man/woman,
nature/culture and human animal/non-human animal. This polarisation
situates woman
and animal in a secondary, subordinate and
discriminated location - in relation to man. Dichotomisation is not
derived from essential biological properties, it is a learned mode of
thinking, perceiving and knowing that transforms reality into static,
oppositional and hierarchical conceptual categories. These conceptual
categories are confined to the manifestation of specific ideas and images
in regard to subjectivity and identity. It is the constructed categories of
subjectivity and identity that are the focus of racism, sexism and
speciesism.
The connection between categories of subjectivity and identity is neither
random nor natural. Inherent to Cartesian dualism is the disassociation of
mind from body6 and the connection of mind with culture and man. This
network of connections excludes any being that is not cultured, white,
middle (or upper) class, Western and a citizen. Women, animals, people
of other races are all necessarily excluded. Descartes orchestrated a
network of strategic connections that systematically excluded woman regardless of whether this was his intent, it was a consequence. The
exclusion of woman was based on her constructed and assumed
association with nature7 and the body. My argument is that the exclusion
of woman is connected to other forms of exclusion. Cartesian
epistemological paradigms provide a basis with which to justify the
exclusionary concepts of racism, sexism and speciesism.
Cartesianism is based on the polarisation of terms. It posits the
privileged designation of positive for one term (in this context: subject,
man and human). The privileged classification is dependent on the
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negation or oppression and, or, suppression of its opposite term (other,
woman and animal). This necessary relationship is one of determined
advantage or disadvantage. This relationship is central to speciesism and
sexism, and it is a primary reason for the indefensibility of speciesism.
Another reason is that while the consequences of negation, oppression or
suppression are visible the strategic connections that inform these
processes are invisible. Debates about abortion, reproductive technology
and the availability of contraception for women - in both Western and
non-Western cultures - provide an example of the binary of
visibility/invisibility. Denial of these services and technologies is
arguably a visible form of oppression, but the processes that inform the
politicisation of females as a producer of progeny, food, sexual desire
and so on are invisible. ‘Natural’ vocation, economic rationality, beauty
and religious faith are indicative of some of the beliefs and processes
used to justify mandates on reproductive technology. Economic
rationalism is exemplified in the following: 'The dual aims of veal
production are firstly, to produce a calf of the greatest weight in the
shortest possible time and secondly, to keep its meat as light coloured as
possible to fulfil the consumers requirement. All at a profit
commensurate to the risk and investment involved.8 The same processes
of economic rationality are used to justify a variety of discriminatory
treatments from the immobilisation and over-feeding of veal calves to
negating the value of ‘women’s work’ because it would unbalance the
national economy. None of these terms are isolated, objective, neutral
concepts. Each term has a complex history of associations that
predetermine specific responses.
Arguing that each term has a complex history of associations and
consequences is best explained according to Foucauldian theory. For
Foucault, social formations - in combination with his classificatory
systems of thought - are the current aftermath of former struggles. These
classificatory systems are rendered invisible through processes of
naturalisation.9 In other words interpretation of the networks that link
exceptions and qualifications to normative evaluative classificatory
systems is required. The rendering invisible of classificatory systems of
thought means that deconstruction of these processes of naturalisation
can be used to reveal ‘invisible’ organising elements and principles. The
implicit messages encoded within the concepts of speciesism and
sexism can be rendered visible because systems of knowledge are
predicated on invisible organising terms, that is, categories of
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knowledges. Decoding is possible partly because classificatory systems
of thought are not atemporal, ahistorical and continual. They are subject
to socio-political and economic struggle. This means that the occurrence
of changes may render obvious previously invisible organising elements
within systems of knowledges.
Foucault would argue that the intimate reciprocal associations between
related concepts in dualisms (for example woman, animal, natural,
manipulable ) create subordinated, habituated, docile bodies that are
brought closer to an idealised standard. Processes of reciprocity,
elementary to dualist concepts, instigate the automatic and perpetual
functioning of distinctions based on concepts of ‘normality’,
‘abnormality’, race, sex and species. For instance, idealised notions of
‘femininity’ require specific repetitive practices.10 Romanticised
versions of animal behaviour illustrate how culturally generated
representations of subjectivity assume the validity of ‘truthfulness’ when
they are in accord with publicly predetermined notions of ‘who we are’
and ‘who or what they are’.The pastoral image of a dairy cow wandering
around a lush green pasture - featuring in butter and milk advertisements
- is an example of a romanticised version of reality. The industrialisation
of the dairy business means an intense five year cycle of pregnancy and
hyperlactaction, after which the dairy cow is slaughtered. Mastitis,
infected teats and internal cannibalisation of body tissue are common
effects of dairy industrialisation.11 The mediatory process involved in
feminising woman and romanticising animals indicates the gradual and
cumulative objectification of woman and animal.
Objectification is achieved through the formation of specific knowledges
by discourses of power. These formulated knowledges have the effect of
dictating desired and non-desired characteristics thereby classifying a
specific norm as preferential. The racial norm of whiteness is perhaps the
most common and one of the most exclusive normative characteristics
preferred by Caucasian Western cultures. Race, education, location and
communicative abilities, to name a few qualifying characteristics, can
automatically deny or warrant membership to the preferred norm. When
certain characteristics are privileged and combined they reinforce each
other in a circular process, multiplying their individual effects. These
circular processes, which are intersubjective and interactive, produce the
appearance of normality, a major consequence of which is invisibility.
The invisibility of circular processes means the processes that produce
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norms are themselves unapparent, so it is difference that is remarked on
and set apart. In other words the absence of difference represents a
privileged condition. In this way psychical characteristics are connected
to anatomical features in a determining manner that facilitates the
categorisation of a living being into a type, a species. Even though
animal and woman may appear to be totally disparate concepts, their
categorisation as other is a parallel that identifies their mutual relations.
Categorisation as other is processed through discourses of power.
Inclusion within the category of other is influenced by motive and
investment. For example, investment and authority is evident in the
following explicit, supposedly guiltless, admission of cruelty. They hate
it! The pigs just hate it! And I suppose we could probably do without
tail-docking if we gave them more room, because they don’t get so crazy
and mean when they have more space. With enough room, they’re
actually quite nice animals. But we can’t afford it. These buildings cost a
lot.' A non-speciesist discourse would not justify death from porcine
stress syndrome because it 'in no way nullify[s] the extra return obtained
from the higher total output'.12
The relationship of the subject13 to the power/knowledge network, and
therefore the motive and investment of the subject, must be established.
Though he did not suggest this, a Foucauldian genealogy of connections
can be used to make visible the connections between the supposedly
disparate concepts of speciesism and sexism thereby manifesting the
active and systematic processes of participation and motivation. Both
these processes are fundamental to producing coherent knowledges; in
other words, to make visible, and thereby accountable specific discourses
and speakers who/that have the power to construct, categorise and
determine meaning and to conceal their investments while doing so.
It is the sexed and embodied subject (for example, the pig-farmer) who
experiences and practises the ideas that guarantee the connection
between knowledge and practice.14 Open declaration of intent and
context by the speaker of discourse may alleviate the deception inherent
in the existing (Western) power/knowledge networks. However, it does
not explain either how or why porcine stress syndrome can be an
acceptable factor in the pork industry. I agree with Althusser’s assertion,
that the way in which we understand the experience of ourselves (such as
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our subjecthood) is directly related to pre-determined constructions of
social categories within specific ideological frameworks.15
For Althusser, the concrete existence of ideology16 is manifested in
systems of belief, (dead meat is necessary to human health) everyday
practices (tail-docking, debeaking), institutions (agribusinesses,
supermarkets) and social structures (economic rationality justifies
abusive farming practices) which function to rationalise and justify
widespread values (animal value is judged according to use) and
conventions (animals don’t feel pain). These systems have the potential
to render invisible or distort the real operations of power.17 This means
that ideology produces, or interpellates individuals as historically and
culturally specific subjects.18 The concepts of sexism and speciesism
transform the concrete existence of women and animals and reconstruct
them as part of the social totality, partly because woman and animal,
historically, represent a category, a social relation, not an individual. By
which I mean the actuality of woman and animal in real, material social,
political and environmental discourses do not get translated into the
social anthropocentric constructed totality. Althusser demonstrates that
categories of thought
(sexuality, race, animality, identity and
subjecthood) need to be historically and culturally contextualized, to
prevent uncritical acceptance, and to render visible the investments of
ideological and power relations.19
This is evident in the way increasingly varied types of animal research
are revealing different forms of social relations, tool making, and
communication amongst animals. Cooperative hunting through division
of labour and coordinative signalling by Aplomado falcons20 is one
example of animal social relationships. Another is the manipulation by
beaver family units of their local environment.21 Tool use can be
demonstrated by the sea otters use of stones to hammer loose molluscs
and abalones.22 A good example of animal communication as a two-way
process is provided by the semantic alarm calls of vervet monkeys that
indicate different types of danger and clearly generate specific responses
depending on whether the predator is a leopard, eagle or python.23
These diverse characteristics (social relations, tool making, and
communication), previously the domain of the exclusively ‘cultured’ are
not correspondingly represented in our treatment, relationship or attitude
to animals. Similarly, women are increasingly diversifying in social and
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political arenas, but this is also under represented in our systems of
social knowledges.
With the help of theoreticians like Foucault and Althusser, it is possible
to argue that systems of knowledges, discourses and concepts
interconnect. Therefore, we can expose weak links, or generate
alternative pathways. One could produce counter practices, counter
strategies and counter discourses in an effort to re-direct the existing
strategies of power and ideology at a local and conjunctural level, rather
than simply trying to eliminate them. Both a rationalist and an empiricist
view would reject Foucault’s genealogy as a method of producing
knowledge because it does not prove continuity between historical
events, nor does it focus on origins or causal relationships and so cannot
produce essential singular truths.
Deconstructionism, however, provides the opportunity to acknowledge
and
describe
without
recreating
conceptual
oppositions.
Deconstructionists claim that meaning and interpretation are produced
through the artificial and constructed contrasts of dichotomous terms.
Derridaen deconstructionism argues that analysis of the marginalised
dichotomous concept and the characteristics of its exclusion, prove that
the privileged concept derives its meaning and pre-eminence through the
contrast and suppression of the marginalised concept.24 Therefore the
privileged concept does not achieve either unmitigated identity or
conceptual absoluteness; instead its parasitic and contaminatory nature
becomes evident. Deconstructionism could provide a new and positive
discourse of the body and of the subject, which would be socially and
historically contextual and non-dualistic in its approach. This would be
possible because the unity, continuity and coherence of the body and the
subject can be shown to have no natural biological pre-determined basis.
Deconstruction argues that natural biological pre-determination is an
effect of traditional discourses of knowledge. If speciesism is seen to be
an effect of traditional discourses of knowledge then speciesism is a
constructed and pre-meditated position. It follows that a constructed
position can be broken down into its constitutive elements and its
foundational networks of bias and profit made visible.
Systematic networks of bias and profit are paralleled within the
construction of sexism. It is not difficult to find feminist criticism25
which is directed against defining woman on the basis of her body.
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Biologically determined paradigms rationalise objectification and
utilisation of woman (as property) solely on the basis of what she can
produce for man. This last point is equally true for female animals.26 In
response, a proponent of factory farming might argue that it is the
female animals’ biological reproductive characteristics which dictate
their predominance in ‘modern’ farming practices: 'The modern layer is,
after all, only a very efficient converting machine, changing the raw
material - feeding stuffs - into the finished product - the egg - less, of
course, maintenance requirements.'27 This quote, from a farm industry
trade journal, wherein one might expect to find the most favourable
accounts of the farming industry, demonstrates the Cartesian
interpretation of body as machine . The attitude expressed in this quote is
not dissimilar to descriptions of the female uterus as a ‘vessel’ or
‘storage space’ passively receptive to the ‘active’ male seed. These
similarities correlate with the Western historical tradition which
conceptualises the body as a machine. 'Thus I may consider the human
body as a machine, fitted together and made up of bones, sinews,
muscles, veins, blood and skin in such way that, even if there were no
mind in it, it would still carry out all the operations that, as things are, do
not depend on the command of the will, nor, therefore, on the mind'.28
Inherent to the concept of body as machine are assumptions that help
explain the parallel treatment of female humans and female animals. The
most common assumption about machines is their specific functionality
added to which is the value, use and productivity that can be gained from
the possession of the machine. Fundamental to the concept of body as
machine is Descartes' disassociation of mind and body. I am not that set
of limbs called the human body. For Descartes the mind (or
consciousness) is unextended and indivisible, while the body (or matter)
is both extended and divisible.29 When this divisibility is applied to
animals, it supports their exploitation because fundamental to
Cartesianism is the pre-eminent value of mind (and soul) and the
subjugation of body to the mind. In the context of animals this translates
as the subjugation and expendability of animals to the interests of man.
This ‘rationalisation’ denies an inherent value of animals in themselves,
to each other and in relation to the ecosystem. Values which, a nonanthropocentric viewpoint might argue could outweigh the needs and
wants of man and justify a balanced, mutually beneficial relationship
between humans and animals.
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Human-animal relations are widespread, diverse and longstanding as
indicated by Native American names such as Running Deer and
Hawkeye,30 Ancient Egyptian religious beliefs featuring human-animal
hybrid gods, seeing-eye-dogs and patents that have been taken out on
genetically altered pigs with a human immune system.31 These humananimal relationships, indicate that crossing the human-animal divide is
considered justifiable if it is to human advantage. A contradiction exists
in the sometime separation and at other times combination of human and
animal. We separate and hierarchise our relationships on the basis of
difference and at the same time cite our mutual compatibility as the basis
for combining human with animal. For example, consider the
relationship between owner and domestic pet; farmer and commercial
product; and animal donor organs and human health. In these cases
human and animal subjectivity is a flexible, manipulable construct. The
relationships between types of discrimination and prejudice are mutually
supportive and may be seen in the way the human-animal hierarchy is
used to confirm racist human-human hierarchies. The stereotypical
representation of non-caucasians as ‘blacks’ originates from falsely
constructed stereotypes about animals. They set up ‘black’ and ‘beastly’
as exact synonyms, evidenced in the following book title: The Negro: A
Beast..32 Humans distinguish ourselves from all non-human animals on
the basis that we are superior, mentally, genetically, socially and
spiritually. These distinctions are thought to exist, even though humans
are genetically and behaviourally closer to primates, than primates are to
amphibians. Unless it is to human advantage, we disregard animal
welfare, intelligence and wellbeing because we maintain a hierarchical
paradigm that stipulates a superior/inferior divide.
As Midgley argues, speciesism presupposes a massive, hierarchised
distinction between humans and non-humans.33 This distinction
determines how we define and practice morality and it determines how
we judge the importance, utility and value of any non-human. 'Degrees
of capacity on either side of the human species-barrier are not allowed
to affect this sharp divide.'34 Importance, utility and value are decided
and classified in terms of human benefit and advantage. Value is judged
only in human terms. Vivisectionists argue for continual animal
experimentation on the grounds of human to animal similarities. At the
same time, they contrarily claim an uncrossable divide between humans
and non-humans.
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This divide justifies treatment of non-humans that is considered cruelly
untenable for humans.35 The well-being and well-fare of the non-human
is inconsequential in comparison to the privilege and preference
accorded to humanness; 'animals used in biomedical research should not
be considered as mere animals but rather as standardised biological
research tools'.36 The implicit construction is that, after all, tools are for
human use, advantage and profit. This perspective is completely
anthropocentric: it is the elevation of humans as superior to animals
regardless of context. There is no context left for the needs and wellbeing of animals to be considered in preference to humans. Extinction of
an entire species is possible on these terms. Nor is speciesism limited by
time, geography or culture. For instance, the expanding human
population in the Mediterranean reduced animal habitats and
extinguished lions and leopards by 200BC in Greece and Asia Minor.
The last pair of Auks (a flightless seabird) were killed in 1844 in Iceland.
On Mauritius, the ground nesting dodo was extinct by 1681. The North
American passenger pigeon thought to have numbered about 5 billion
was hunted to extinction between 1630 and 1914. One animal species
every four years became extinct between 1600-1900. By the 1970’s
about 1000 animal species were made extinct each year. It is estimated
that 20 percent of the worlds animal and plant species will be extinct
before 2000.37 This version of human superiority justifies cruel and
abusive practices towards animals in the pursuit of knowledge and profit.
Speciesist practices are maintained through ignorance, isolation,
legislation and secrecy which protect agricultural industries and research
institutions from a critical and punitive public scrutiny. 38
Anthropocentric thought requires animals to conform to human standards
of intelligence and communication, if we are to extend to them human
rights and inherent value. I find anthropocentricity problematic on two
counts, firstly because it does not recognise or accommodate non-human
standards of intelligence, communication, rights and value. Secondly it
establishes a singular standard for human rights and human values which
are pre-eminent, universal and absolute. These characteristics exclude
possibilities for change, difference and alterity - amongst humans, let
alone recognising the possibility for parallel or concurrent rights, values
and intelligences by other species. This perspective maintains that
animals lack the ability to think, to emote or to consider consequences,
supporting the presumption that humans are superior. It continues,
contrary to current research into non-human behaviour and cognition.

66

Herman’s39 bottle nose dolphin experiments indicate, amongst other
things: understanding of word order, observational learning, self-training
and the refusal to respond to nonsense commands. Given these and other
empirically validated examples it seems advisable to dispute the
human/animal divide and to examine what humans regard as
communication and understanding and the capacity to abstract.
Regan and Singer reproduce the idea that rationality and the capacity to
abstract are essential qualities and so they indirectly support speciesism.
My reasons for this claim are twofold. Firstly, their dual focus on
rationality reproduces a biased, normative, hierarchical reason/emotion
dichotomy. Secondly, if abstraction is the basis for speciesism then the
consequences of speciesism are distanced to the point of virtual
ineffectuality. The separation and distancing of theory and practice is
self-defeating and self-perpetuating. Considering speciesism outside of
its practical application removes responsibility to act, or change, through
disassociation of the self from speciesist practices.
I have argued that the theory and practice of speciesism are
interdependent. By which I mean the justification for abusive factory
farming practices is derived from the belief that animals are inferior to
humans. It places the onus of proof on the animal or on the human to
prove otherwise.
Why do all non-human animals have to compete with human animals in
a contest for equality? As Midgley argues, the idea that moral agents
represent a chosen archetype and interact within a contractual circle of
morality on an equal basis is self-defeating.40 The notion that all moral
agents must be of a certain type implies circumscribed boundaries. These
boundaries exclude or deny moral agency to any being that does not
comply with pre-determined qualities. Rather the onus should be on
those (human animals) who have the authority and power to extend
respect and kindness. If a reciprocal arrangement is required, then it can
be justified on the basis of what associated species can contribute to
human welfare and well-being.
I do not know, however, whether I would go so far as to suggest that this
be our Kantian duty. Kant’s notion of duty includes the polarisation of
duty and inclination, and the inherent valuation of intent as of greater
significance than the consequences of the act.41 Instead I lean towards
Hegel’s moral consequentialism which stipulates consequences must be
taken into account.42 For Hegel, rational (social, economic, legal,
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occupational and political) institutions form a system that is
paradigmatic of objective ethical life. In turn, the individual is
predisposed to behave in accordance with norms and conventions
proposed by those rational social (etc)institutions.43 Hegel would deny
moral rights and moral acts to animals because they lack rationality and
freedom. However, his idea that the nature of a moral action must
include any unintentional or unforseen consequences that develop
condemns the maltreatment of animals by factory farmer, and researcher
as immoral - even if they believe in the greater good or the inability of
animals to experience pain. It follows that what is expected of each
individual is context dependent, which means that motive and intent are
context dependent.
Benton’s position is context dependent. He rejects Regan’s distinctions
between types of moral patients and rejects Singer’s theory because it is
too difficult to weigh up different types of pleasure and pain. He argues
that human animals and non-human animals are all embedded within
ecological niches. We cannot abstract individuals from their
embededness because it can lead to misguided actions. For Benton the
individual is indissolubly bound up in their social and ecological
position, relationships and conditions of life. Benton argues that focusing
on, or isolating, specific characteristics or qualities such as a ‘rationality’
or ‘emotion’ results is an incomplete solution. Human-animal and nonhuman-animal embededness must be considered in their own particular
contexts and relationships. Social relations are not necessarily species
specific consider, for example, the ownership of a pet kitten by the
gorilla Koko.44 This was a relationship which defies commonly accepted
boundaries for friendship and ownership. Furthermore, the satisfaction of
need is essential for survival and well being of individuals. Benton is
aware of the difficulty in distinguishing between genuine and superficial
needs however he does not give any clear criteria for deciding between a
conflict of needs. This is problematic because needs are Benton’s basis
for morally valid claims.45 For Benton both human animals and nonhuman animals can be in relationships and therefore can be moral
agents.. Accordingly, a moral claim which meets the needs of humans at
the expense of animals could be presented using Benton’s moral
paradigm.
The exclusionism and denigration inherent to racism and sexism has a
custom-made feel to it, limiting the scope of rights and moral agency. to
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particular kinds of subjects. The non-included subjects are denied and
excluded by definition, simply because they are not white men.46
Humans comprise one species, that is, one biological classification.
Racism and sexism, referring as they do to human-to-human interaction
on a cultural or (biological) sex difference are defined and reproduced in
human terms, therefore they are in a sense restricted to a human context.
This is not to say that the consequences of racism are determined solely
by race. As I argued previously (when discussing the dichotomous
aspects of these terms) the concepts of racism and sexism do not operate
alone, they materialise historical and contemporary beliefs and bias.
Speciesism covers a broader area than the concepts of racism and
sexism. It relates to the immense scale of difference between humans
and non-human animals. It is a classic example of anthropocentric
thinking which blends the multiple, complex, varied possibilities in the
animal macrocosmos into a single category: animal, specifically a nonhuman animal. The relative homogeneity of human habitats in
comparison to the heterogeneity of non-human-animal habitat
requirements should be enough to recognise that the anthropocentric
nature of the term 'speciesism' renders it invalid and indefensible as a
position.
Unfortunately, most people would not consider it an adequate rebuttal to
speciesism. This is because discourses of power are not disembodied
structures that simply produce knowledge and meaning. Each concept
must be located and contextualised because it is not an isolated
neutrality. If we argue that each individual does not create their own
knowledges and truth then meaning is the property and product of the
social community. However this is not to say that knowledge is
disconnected from speakers and discourse, instead it is to say that
knowledge is not independent of theory and subjectivity. It follows that
acknowledging that subjectivity is constructed is required to balance the
alleged guaranty and intellectual appeal of knowledge.
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